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MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW
THE JURISDICTION OF A COURT OF EQUITY OVER
PERSONS TO COMPEL THE DOING OF ACTS
OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL LIMITS
OF THE STATE"
By ERNEST J. MESSNER*
C OURTS of equity are sometimes called upon to act in cases
where the subject matter is located outside the state or
Mhere the relief sought calls for the doing of acts extra-terri-
torially. There are perhaps a greater number of cases in which
equity courts have refused to act in such situations than where
the desired relief was granted. This refusal to entertain jurisdic-
tion generally has been based upon two reasons, the first, that
the subject matter was beyond the jurisdiction of the court, and
to act would have been an interference with the sovereignty of
that state wherein the subject matter was located, and the second,
that the court lacked the necessary power and machinery to en-
force and carry into effect its decree.
The question that presents itself is whether, in such a situa-
tion, equity courts lack jurisdiction to act, or whether it is merely
a refusal to exercise the power which is discretionary in the
courts of chancery.
The primary purpose of this article will be to arrive at an
answer to this question, and to accomplish this a study of the
cases is essential. The cases chosen for the purposes deal with
situations in which the parties are within the jurisdiction of the
court, but the remedy asked or the relief sought has to do with
a subject matter located outside the territorial jurisdiction of
the court, or calls for the doing of or refraining from doing some
act outside of the limits of the state wherein the court rendering
the decree is located.
*Of the Minnesota Bar.
tThis is the substance of a thesis which was submitted for the
degree of Master of Laws, University of Minnesota, 1929. The writer
is deeply indebted to Professor H. L. McClintock of the University of
Minnesota Law School, for his many helpful criticisms and suggestions
in the writing of this article.
JURISDICTION OF EQUITY
The body of this article will discuss generally the cases deal-
ing with the following points:
(1) The power of a court of equity to restrain proceedings in
a foreign tribunal.
(2) The power of an equity court to decree a conveyance of
foreign lands.
(3) The power of a court of equity to restrain or compel the
doing of some act outside the territorial limits of the state.
I
THE POWER OF A COURT OF EQUITY TO RESTRAIN PROCEEDINGS
IN A FOREIGN TRIBUNAL'
It is a fundamental principle that the courts of one state can
exercise no control over the courts of another state. This is so
because each state within its own territorial limits is supreme. It
is independent, and any attempt to interfere would be contrary
to state sovereignty. 2 It was because of this reason that courts
formerly hesitated to act when called upon to stay proceedings
about to be commenced or already commenced in the courts of
another state or country. Even today courts are reluctant to grant
such relief unless the case clearly calls for such action.' Another
objection, which was early raised, regarding the constitutionality
of such action, was as to whether or not this violated the full faith
and credit clause and the interstate privileges and: immunities clause
of the federal constitution. It has now been settled that such an
exercise of power is not unconstitutional."
It is now firmly established that the courts of equity of one
state can grant an injunction to restrain the proceedings in another
state without interfering with the sovereignty of that other state.
The reason given for this is that the decree is not directed to the
courts of that other state, and is not an attempt to control or direct
the proceedings in the foreign courts, but is one in personain
directed to the parties to the suit.' The theory upon which the
1(1922) 22 Col. L. Rev. 360-364.
22 Story, Equity, 14th. ed., sec. 1224.
3jones v. Hughes, (1912) 156 Iowa 684, 137 N. W. 1023, 42 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 502; Freick v. Hinkly, (1913) 122 Minn. 24, 141 N. NV. 1096,
46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 695.
4Cole v. Cunningham, (1890) 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33
L. Ed. 538; State ex rel. Bogsung v. District Court, (1918) 140 Minn.
494, 168 N. W. 589, 1 A. L. R. 145.5Perhaps the best statement of the rule is found in the case of
Dehon v. Foster, (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 545, where on page 550
Bigelow, C. J., says: " . . . In the exercise of this power, courts of
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courts act, in granting this relief, is that they have authority to
control the persons within the territorial limits of the state, and,
having jurisdiction of the parties, can render a decree which the
parties are bound to respect and obey, even beyond the territorial
limits of the state.6 So long as a citizen is a resident of a state,
he owes it obedience,7 and the decree, when directed to the parties
to the suit, can be enforced by the court issuing it by process in
personam. s
The question still remains as to when the courts of one state
will take this action. No general rule can be laid down, but each
case must be governed by its own circumstances. It may be stated
generally that where the equities of the case demand such inter-
ference, so as to prevent a party from obtaining an inequitable
advantage to the injury of the other party, and to enable the court
to do justice, an injunction will be granted," or other adequate
relief given."
equity proceed, not upon any claim of right to interfere with or
control the course of proceedings in other tribunals, or to prevent
them from adjudicating on the rights of the parties when drawn in
controversy and duly presented for their determination. But the
jurisdiction is founded on the clear authority vested in courts of equity
over persons within the limits of their jurisdiction and amenable to
process, to restrain them from doing acts which will work wrong and
injury to others, and are therefore contrary to equity and good
conscience. . . . . See Cole v. Cunningham, (1890) 133 U. S. 107, 10
Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed. 538; Philadelphia Co. v. Stimson, (1912) 223
U. S. 605, 620, 32 Sup Ct. 340. 56 L. Ed. 570; Hawkins v. Ireland,
(1896) 64 Minn. 339, 67 N. 1V. 73, 58 Am. St. Rep. 534 and note: State
ex rel. Bossung v. District Court, (1918) 140 Minn. 494, 168 N. W. 589,
1 A. L. R. 145; Union Pacific Ry. v. Rule, (1923) 155 Minn. 302, 1)3
N. W. 161; Carson v. Dunham, (1889) 149 Mass. 52, 20 N. E. 312, 3
L. R. A. 203, 14 Am. St. Rep. 397.
GIn Keyser v. Rice, (1877) 47 Md. 203, 28 Am. Rep. 448, llowie,
J., at page 213 said, "The power of the state to compel its citizens to
respect its laws, even beyond its own territorial limits, is supported we
think by a great preponderance of precedent anl authority." See
Moton v. Hull, (1890) 77 Tex. 80. 13 S. W. 849, 8 L. R. A. 722.7Keyser v. Rice, (1877) 47 Md. 203, 28 Am. Rep. 448.
82 Story, Equity, 14th ed., sees. 1224-1225: 1 Spelling, Injunctions,
2nd. ed., sec. 49. See Dehon v. Foster, (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 545;
Harris v. Pullman (1876) 84 Ill. 20, 28, 25 Am. Rep. 416.
'OCunningham v. Butler, (1886) 142 Mass. 47. 6 N. E. 782, 56 Am.
Rep. 657 and note; Hawkins v. Ireland, (1896) 64 Minn. 339, 67 N. W.
73, 58 Am. St. Rep. 534 and note; Freick v. Hinkly, (1913) 122 Minn.
24, 141 N. W. 1096, 46 L. R. A. (N.S.) 695; Wilser v. Wilser, (1916) 132
Minn. 167, 156 N. W. 271.
10In Hazen v. Lyndonville Nat'l Bank, (1898) 70 Vt. 543, 41 Ati.
1046, 67 Am. St. Rep. 680, Thompson, J., -said, "By reason of the acts
of the defendants committed since the service of process upon them, an
injunction would now furnish them no relief. Whenever a court of equity
has jurisdiction to entertain a bill for an injunction against the com-
mission or continuance of a wrongful act, it may award damages in sub-
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There are numerous cases and instances in which the courts
of equity have granted such relief upon a proper case being made
out. Ordinarily, where the purpose of the foreign suit is to evade
the laws of the domicile, an injunction will be granted."1 Examples
of this type of cases are those in which the effect of the foreign
suit is to obtain a preference which is not obtainable in the state of
the domicile,"2 and those in which it is sought to evade the exemp-
tion laws of the domiciliary state.3 It is to be noted that this
difference in laws must be a difference in the substantive laws,
and a difference merely in procedural laws will not be sufficient."'
Other situations in which the courts have acted and have
restrained actions in a foreign court are those in which the for-
eign suit was contra to the settled public policy of the state;" in
which the party in the suit in another state would be subjected to
a liability, notwithstanding the conduct of the other party, which,
in the courts of their residence would be a complete bar to such
liability;", in which the institution of the suit in another state
was fraudulent and malicious, and was brought for the purpose
of vexing harassing, and oppressing another citizen ;'- in which
it would be a substantial and needless disadvantage to compel one
to make defense by depositions, when bringing suit in a place where
it can be brought without disadvantage to either party would obvi-
ate the need of defending by that method ;1s and in which the
stitution for such injunction, when the defendant by his acts committed
subsequent to the service of process upon him has rendered relief by
injunction ineffectual."
111 Spelling, Injunctions, 2nd ed., sec. 50. See also Miller v. Gittings,
(1897) 85 Md. 601, 37 Atl. 372, 37 L. R. A. 654, 60 Am. St. Rep. 352
and note, in which Bryan, J., said "The authorities show that equity will
enjoin suits in other states where there is fraud, oppression, vexation,
injustice, or unconscientious advantage and most especially where there
is an attempt to evade or defeat the operation of the laws of the state
where both parties to the suit reside."
"2Cole v. Cunningham, (1890) 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33
L. Ed. 538; Dehon v. Foster, (1862) 4 Allen (Mass.) 545.
'3Moton v. Hull, (1890) 77 Tex. 80, 13 S. W. 849, 8 L. R. A. 722;
Allen v. Buchanan, (1892) 97 Ala. 399, 11 So. 777, 38 Ani. St. Rep.
187; Wierse v. Thomas, (1907) 145 N. C. 261, 59 S. E. 58, 15 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 1008, 122 Am. St. Rep. 446.
14American Express Co. v. Fox, (1916) 135 Tenn. 489, 187 S. W.
1117, Ann. Cas. 1918B 1148; Lancaster v. Dunn, (1922) 153 La. 15.
95 So. 385.
35Miller v. Gittings, (1897) 85 Md. 601, 37 At. 372, 37 L. R. A. 654,
60 Am. St. Rep. 352 and note; Wabash Ry. v. Peterson, (1919) 187 Iowa
1331, 175 N. W. 523.
16Weaver v. Alabama Great So. Ry., (1917) 200 Ala. 432, 76 So. 364.
"7,Mason v. Harlow, (1911) 84 Kan. 277, 114 Pac. 218, 33 L R. A.
(N.S.) 234.
ISWabash Ry. v. Peterson, (1919) 187 Iowa 1331, 175 N. W. 523.
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facts were of such a character as to make it the duty of the court
to restrain the party from instituting like proceedings in a court of
that state." The fact that the subject matter of the suit is in
another state and the action, which the party is forbidden further
to prosecute, is there pending, does not affect the question of the
power of the court in the premises.2 0
As has been said before, the courts are reluctant to grant this
relief, and exercise this power sparingly because of the comity
which ought to prevail among sovereignties .2 1 Hence where the
other suit is prior in time, unless clear equitable grounds exist,
the injunction will be denied. 2 An example of this would be
where a contract was made in state X between A and 13 and,
according to statute in state X, A has a good defense when sued
on the contract. B sues A in state Y, where such defense does
not exist by statute. If A seeks to have the courts of state X
enjoin B from prosecuting this suit in state Y, solely on the
ground that in state Y he has no defense, yet fails to show that
state Y will not apply the laws of state X to the contract, the
injunction will be denied.2 3
In a few cases the courts have gone so far as to say that,
after suits have once been commenced in foreign courts, they
will refuse to interfere because it would be inconsistent with inter-
state harmony that their prosecution should be controlled by the
court of another state.2 4  But this view has not been adopted
'
9 See French, Trustee v. Hay, (1874) 22 Wall. (U.S.) 250, 22 L.
Ed. 857; Moton v. Hull, (1890) 77 Tex. 80, 13 S. W. 849, 8 L. R. A. 722.20Hawkins v. Ireland, (1896) 64 Minn. 339, 67 N. W. 73, 58 Am.
St. Rep. 534 and note.
21In Bigelow v. Old Dominion, etc., Co., (1908) 74 N. J. Eq. 457,
71 Atl. 153, it was stated by Pitney, J., "But on general principles, equity
will not interfere with the right of any person to bring an action for
the redress of grievances-the right preservative of all rights-except for
grave reasons; and on grounds of comity the power of one state to inter-
fere with a litigant who is in due course pursuing his rights and remedies
in the courts of another state ought to be sparingly exercised." See also
Cole v. Cunningham, (1890) 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed.
538; Jones v. Hughes, (.1912) 156 Iowa 684, 137 N. W. 1023, 42 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 502.
-2Harris v. Pullman, (1876) 84 Ill. 20, 25 Am. Rep. 416: Carson v.
Dunham, (1889) 149 Mass. 52, 20 N. E. 312, 3 L. R. A. 203, 14 Am.
St. Rep. 397; Jones v. Hughes, (1912) 156 Iowa 684, 137 N. W. 1023,
42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 502.
-3Freick v. Hinkly, (1913) 122 Minn. 24, 141 N. W. 1096, 46 L. R.
A. (N.S.) 695; Buchanan-Vaughan Auto Co. v. Woosley, (Tex. Civ. App.
1919) 218 S. W. 554.
24Chancellor Walworth, in Meade v. Merritt, (1831) 2 Paige (N.Y.)
402, said, ". . . Not only comity, but public policy forbids the exercise
of such power. If this court should sustain an injunction bill to restrain
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by the majority of the courts of this country, and of this view
Mr. Justice Fuller, in Cole v. Ctinninghant,25 says:
"But this reasoning has not commended itself to the judicial
mind, for the injunction is not directed to the courts of the other
state, but simply to the parties litigant; and, although the power
should be exercised with care, and with a just regard to the comity
which ought to prevail among coordinate sovereignties, yet its
existence cannot at this day be denied."
An exception to this rule is that the state will not enjoin suits
in the federal courts and vice versa, 2  unless it is necessary to
protect the jurisdiction of the court first acquiring control of tile
parties and the subject matter.2 7
A limitation on the rule is that at least the party, against whom
the injunction is sought, must be a resident of the state wherein
the injunction is sought.s The fact that a non-resident has
brought an action in a state court does not place his person under
the control of the court for all purposes, but gives the court only
the right to prescribe the terms upon which he may be allowed
to prosecute his action therein.2 9  A reason suggested for such
proceedings previously commenced in a sister state, tle court of that
state might retaliate upon the complainant, who was the defendant in
the suit there; and by process of attachment, might compel him to relin-
quish the suit subsequently commenced here. By this course of proceed-
ing, the courts of different states would indirectly be brought into colli-
sion with each other in regard to jurisdiction; and the rights of suitors
might be lost sight of in a useless struggle for what might be considered
the legitimate powers and rights of courts." See Harris Y. Pullman,
(1876) 84 Ill. 20, 25 Am. Rep. 416; Carson v. Dunham, (1889) 149
Mass. 52, 20 N. E. 312, 3 L. R. A. 203, 14 Am. St. Rep. 397.
25(1890) 133 U. S. 107, 10 Sup. Ct. 269, 33 L. Ed. 538.
2 6 t is stated in 2 Story, Equity, 14th ed., sec. 1225, that this excep-
tion proceeds upon peculiar grounds of municipal and constitutional law,
the respective courts being entirely competent to administer full relief in
the suits pending therein.
27 1Spelling, Injunctions, 2nd ed., sec. 51, "... Although the con.
stitution is silent upon the right of the courts of either of the two juris-
dictions to enjoin parties from resorting to the other or procteding with
suits already begun in the courts of the other, yet a rule was early adopted,
and has by frequent recognition become established, to the effect that
injunctions will only be granted by a state tribunal to restrain proceed-
ings in a federal court, and vice versa, when necessary to protect the
jurisdiction of the court first acquiring control of the parties and the subject
matter, and in these cases only in personam." See Rickey Laind & Cattle
Co. v. Miller, (1910) 218 U. S. 258, 31 Sup. Ct. 11, 54 L Ed. 1032;
Pitt v. Rodgers, (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1900) 104 Fed. 387; Starr v. Chicago
R. I. & P. Ry., (C.C. Neb. 1901) 110 Fed. 3.
2 Western Union Telegraph Co. v. The Pacific & Atlantic Telegraph
Co., (1868) 49 Ill. 90; Griffith v. Langsdale, (1890) 53 Ark. 71, 13
S. W. 733; but see Bigelow v. Old Dominion, etc., Co., (1908) 74 N. J. Eq.
457, 71 At. 153.2 9Carpenter, Baggott & Co. v. Hanes, (1913) 162 N. C. 46, 77 S. E.
1101, Ann. Cas. 1915A 832.
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refusal to act is that there is a lack of power to enforce the
decree against a non-resident.30 This reason alone should not
offer serious obstacles, however, as a court of equity, acting
upon the person, could demand that he put up a bond to insure
compliance with the decree, or, if he has property within the
jurisdiction, the court could demand that it be sequestered." It
is submitted, however, that this is not a question of jurisdiction
at all, but merely a refusal to act in such a situation because, on
grounds of comity, the power of one state to interfere with a
litigant, who is in due course pursuing his rights and remedies
in the courts of another state, ought to be sparingly exercised.'-
Where one of the parties is a non-resident, the reason for grant-
ing an injunction on the grounds of convenience of witnesses,
expense, evasion of the laws of the domicile, and other grounds
commonly invoked, will most likely be lacking, but, if the proper
case is shown, there does not seem to be any objection to granting
such relief, even in case one of the parties is a non-resident, pro-
vided he is subject to the jurisdiction of the court.
Under this class of cases one more question arises. In case of
violation of the injunction by continuing suit or commencing suit
in a foreign state, when the injunction is introduced either as a
bar or defense to the action, are the courts of the other state
bound to recognize it? There have as yet been only a few cases
in which this question has arisen. In Gilman v. Ketcham,," the
resident creditors of a New York corporation were enjoined by
the New York court from bringing any action against the corpora-
tion for the recovery of any sum of money or from proceeding
further in any action previously commenced. After this order, a
New York creditor of the corporation garnished a debtor of the
corporation in Wisconsin. The debtor paid the money into court,
and the receiver of the New York corporation intervened and
claimed the money. The receiver prevailed in this suit, and the
Wisconsin court, through Mr. Justice Pinney, said:
"There is nothing in the statute of New York or in this pro-
ceeding under it, in conflict with or in contravention of the laws
3OBank of Bellows Falls v. Rutland & Burlington Ry., (1856) 28
Vt. 470.
31(1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 610; (1921) 30 Yale L. J. 865.32Bigelow v. Old Dominion, etc., Co., (1908) 74 N. J. Eq. 457, 71
AtI. 153; Jones v. Hughes, (1912) 156 Iowa 684, 137 N. W. 1023, 42
L R. A. (N.S.) 502.
33(1893) 84 Wis. 60, 54 N. W. 395, 23 L. R. A. 52, 36 Am, St.
Rep. 899.
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or public policy of this state, nor does the present proceeding
interfere, or tend to interfere with or prejudice the rights of
any citizens of this state. The case concerns itself with citizens
of New York alone, and is therefore free from all objection
which, by the general current of authority, might prevent or in-
duce courts of Wisconsin to refrain from giving, in a spirit of
just interstate comity, the same force and effect here to the pro-
ceedings in the supreme court of the state of New York in ques-
tion as would be accorded to them there. . . .The tendency of
modern adjudication is in favor of a liberal extension of inter-
state comity, and against a narrow and provincial policy, which
would deny proper effect to the judicial proceedings of sister
states under their statutes and rights claimed under them, simply
because, technically they are foreign and not domestic."
In Union Pacific Ry. v. Rule,34 the plaintiff, a Utah corpora-
tion, but also regarded as having a residence in Iowa, brought a
bill against the defendant, a citizen of Iowa, in the Iowa district
court, to restrain the defendant from prosecuting a suit in Min-
nesota, for a personal injury sustained in Iowa. The defendant
was served, but defaulted in the Iowa action, and later connenced
suit in Minnesota on the same cause of action and in violation
of the Iowa injunction. The plaintiff then brought an action
to restrain the defendant. The issue in the case was whether
or not the Iowa decree was one which the Minnesota courts must
enforce under the full faith and credit clause of the federal con-
stitution. It was held, Mr. justice Holt writing the opinion,
although himself dissenting from it, that the Iowa injunction was
not entitled to full faith and credit. The court recognizes that
as to parties domiciled in a state, its courts of general jurisdic-
tion may enjoin one from suing the other in the courts of any
other state upon a cause of action suable in the courts of the
state of their domicile, but says that the Iowa decree does not
in any manner adjudicate or affect the defendant's cause of
action, but is predicated solely on the proposition that it will
impose a hardship on the plaintiff to defend in the courts of
this state. The court says that a decree enjoining a part), from
prosecuting an action in another state does not and cannot stay
the courts of that state, and also that the Iowa court has no
authority to curtail by injunction the exercise of rights and priv-
ileges given to one by article 4, section 2, of the federal constitu-
tion. It was held that the Iowa decree was not an adjudication
of any personal or property rights between the parties, so that
34(1923) 155 Minn. 302, 193 N. W. 161.
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by execution or other process of the court, the defendant may
be compelled to render to the plaintiff money or property to which
he is entitled. It can be enforced in Iowa only as for contempt.
The defendant's cause of action is transitory, and the full faith
and credit clause of the constitution does not require the courts
of Minnesota to give credit to this decree of an Iowa court deny-
ing the right to sue in Minnesota on a transitory cause of action
in Iowa.3 1 Justices Holt and Quinn dissented from the holding
on the ground that the Iowa decree determined that the plaintiff
had a right to protection from suit by the defendant in Minne-
sota. The parties and subject matter were within the jurisdic-
tion of the court. This right, so adjudicated, is valuable, and
the decree of the Iowa court comes within the full faith and
credit clause. The action is not to enforce a penalty, but is based
on an adjudicated private right.
In the Wisconsin case, the New York injunction was recog-
nized and given effect bcause of interstate comity. The only
difference in the situation of the two cases is that in the NVis-
consin case a preliminary injunction had been issued prior to
bringing suit in Wisconsin, while in the Minnesota case the in-
junction was not issued until after the proceedings had been
commenced in Minnesota, but, as has been seen, the fact that suit
has been commenced in a foreign court will not prevent the
injunction from being issued, provided proper equitable grounds
are shown. Had the Minnesota court so wished, it clearly could have
recognized the Iowa injunction on the grounds of comity, as
did the Wisconsin court, because there was nothing in conflict
with the public policy of the state of Minnesota. The case
concerned itself wholly with citizens of Iowa, and, therefore,
there were no rights of Minnesota citizens which would be
prejudiced.
It is clear that the Iowa court had jurisdiction over the parties
so as to render a decree binding on the persons. In the suit for
the injunction the Iowa court determined that the equities of
3 51t would seem that the majority opinion in this case is justified
under section 493, Comment b, of the Restatement of the Conflict of
Laws, Tentative Draft No. 5, which is to the effect that an injunction
not going to the merits does not have any effect on the rights of the
defendant in another state. Illustration: "A in state X brings a bill
against B to enjoin his suing A on a certain alleged cause of action in
any other state than X. B sues A on the cause of action in state Y.
and A sets up the injunction in X as a defense. The defense will be
disallowed."
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the case were such as to entitle the plaintiff to an injunction. The
Iowa court adjudicated the private rights of the parties. It
is to be noted that the Iowa court had previously expressed itself,
in Jones v. Hughes,' as being reluctant to interfere with the
right of a resident to go into the courts of another state to secure
such relief as may there be available to him, and would only
interfere where the facts of the case demanded it. Here the
Iowa court had acted and interfered, and had determined
that the plaintiff had a right to be protected from suit by the
defendant in Minnesota. The question, then, is, should the Min-
nesota courts give full faith and credit to this decree, which
determined the equities and private rights of the parties. Mr.
Justice Holmes, in Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferrv,y said, in dis-
cussing the jurisdiction of a court of equity over a person:
"If a judicial proceeding is begun with jurisdiction over the
person, it is within the power of a state to bind him by every
subsequent order in the cause."
In discussing the effect of the decree rendered, he said:
"The decree in this case was made with full jurisdiction and
(apart from the insanity of the defendant, who by the decree
was required to account) could be sued on, and was entitled
to full faith and credit."
He further states that a decree in equity against a defendant
who had left the state after service on him, and who had taken
all of his property with him, would be entitled to full faith
and credit where he was found. In Burnley v. Stc-venson,3s the
Ohio court, in referring to a Kentucky decree concerning lands
in Ohio, said that a decree rendered by a court of a sister state
having jurisdiction of the parties and subject matter, is entitled
to the same force and effect which it had in the state where pro-
nounced. The Ohio court further said that this Kentucky decree,
when pleaded in Ohio courts as a cause of action, or as a de-
fense, must be regarded as conclusive of all the rights and
equities which were adjudicated therein. In Fall v. Fall,3' wife
and husband were divorced in Washington. By the decree, cer-
tain property owned by them jointly in Nebraska was to go to
the wife. The husband was ordered to convey his share, but
refused, and a commissioner then executed a deed of his share.
The husband later conveyed his share to a purchaser with notice.
36(1912) 156 Iowa 684, 137 N. W. 1023, 42 L. R. A. (N.S.) 502.
37(1912) 228 U. S. 346, 33 Sup. Ct. 550, 57 L. Ed. 867.
zs(1873) 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621.
39(1905) 75 Neb. 104, 113 N. W. 175, 121 Am. St. Rep. 767.
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The wife brought suit in Nebraska, claiming title by virtue
of the Washington decree, and sought to have her title quieted,
and to have the deed by the husband to the purchaser with notice
declared void. The Nebraska court decided against her claim.
Chief Justice Sedgwick, in his dissenting opinion, said:
"When, however, issues are presented to a court of competent
jurisdiction and the court having jurisdiction of the parties and
of the issues so presented determine such issues, and the equita-
ble rights of the parties in lands in another state depend upon
the facts so determined, that determination of the equities of
the parties may be relied upon in any litigation that may arise
between the same parties and full faith and credit must be given
to such adjudication of the rights of the parties. '"40
In the appeal of this case to the United States Supreme Court,
under the name of Fall v. Eastin,4' the court cited with favor
the case of Burnley v. Stevenson,4 2 but affirmed the judgment
on the sole ground that neither the decree itself nor any convey-
ance under it, except by the person in whom title is vested, can
operate beyond the jurisdiction of the court. Mr. Justice Holhnes,
concurring specially in this decision, said that the Washington
decree established a personal obligation between the parties; that
a personal decree is equally within the jurisdiction of a court
having the person within its power, whatever its ground and
whatever it orders the defendant to do; that the Washington
decree was entitled to full faith and credit in Nebraska. but that
the Nebraska court carefully avoids saying that the decree would
not be binding between the original parties had the husband
been before the court; that the decision is affirmed because they
regard the decree as imposing no obligation upon a purchaser
with notice; and that the decision, even if wrong, did not deny
the Vashington decree its full effect.
In view of these cases, it is hard to reconcile the decision
of the Minnesota case with the idea that a court of general jur-
4Oln Dobson v. Pearce, (1854) 12 N. Y. 156, 1 Abb. Prac. 97. 62
Am. Dec. 152, the assignor of the plaintiff secured a judgment against the
defendant in New York by fraud. When he sued the defendant on it ii)
Connecticut, the defendant had the action enjoined in a court of equity
in that state. The assignor appeared in that suit and it was found that
the judgment was fraudulently obtained in New York. After plaintiff
acquired the claim by assignment, he sued on it in New York and the
question was as to the effect of the Connecticut decree. The New York
court recognized the Connecticut decree as conclusive of the rights of
the parties.
-1(1909) 215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.)
924, 17 Ann. Cas. 853.
42(1873) 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621.
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isdiction, having jurisdiction of the persons, has power to deter-
mine the equities and private rights of the parties, and that once
determined, these equities and private rights are entitled to full
faith and credit. It would seem as though a possible solution of
the Minnesota case could be worked out in the following manner.
The Minnesota court would recognize the Iowa injunction had
it been granted upon facts which the Minnesota courts would
recognize as constituting grounds for an injunction in M inne-
sota. The Minnesota courts would grant full faith and credit
to the Iowa decree as to its determination of the facts, and
would then apply Minnesota law to those facts as found by the
Iowa court. If, according to Minnesota law, grounds existed
for an injunction, full faith and credit would be given to the
decree. If, however, those facts would not entitle one to an
injunction in Minnesota, the court would not be bound to rec-
.ognize the Iowa decree, as its law necessarily cannot operate and
have any extra-territorial effect. In this way, full faith and credit
would not be denied to the Iowa decree.4 3
In the Rule Case, Iowa had a statute4 prohibiting citizens of
Iowa from bringing suit in a foreign court on a cause of action
suable in the courts of Iowa. Since Minnesota has no corre-
sponding statute, since the Minnesota courts hesitate to curtail,
by injunction, the exercise of rights and privileges given to one
by article 4, section 2, of the federal constitution, and since they
have given full faith and credit to the findings of fact of the
Iowa court, they would not be bound to give full faith and
credit to the injunction. Applying Minnesota laws to those facts,
an injunction will not issue. Consequently, Minnesota was nut
obligated to recognize the legal conclusion drawn from those
facts by the Iowa court.
The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws4 does not specifi-
cally deal with the power of courts of equity to restrain pro-
43The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Tentative Draft No. 5,
would seem to hold this a valid method under Comment a, section 185,
which says, "An act is ordered or enjoined by a court of equity as its dis-
cretionary remedy for a proved wrong. A court of equity will not allow
itself to be deprived of the opportunity to exercise its discretion, both
as to whether it shall admit the plaintiff to sue in equity and as to what
remedy it shall decree, by the action of a court in another state. It
will, however, allow suit on the original claim and will give the effect
of res judicata to the findings of fact in the prior suit between the parties,
reserving for its own discretion the relief to be afforded."
44Iowa, Acts 1917, chap. 293.
45The American Law Institute, Conflict of Laws, Restatement No. 2.
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ceedings in a foreign tribunal, but it would seem as though this
point would come within the general language of section 101,
in which it is stated that a state can exercise, through its courts,
jurisdiction to forbid a person who is subject to its jurisdiction
to do an act in another state.
II
THE POWER OF AN EQUITY COURT TO DECREE A CONVEYANCE
OF FOREIGN LANDS4"
Another type of case in which equitable relief is frequently
sought is that in which complainant seeks a conveyance of lands
situated outside the territorial limits of the court and in another
state or country.
It is a fundamental proposition that real property is subject
to the exclusive jurisdiction of the courts of the state or country
in which it is located,4 7 and title to the property and the validity
or invalidity of every devise, transfer, or conveyance thereof,
must depend upon the lex rei sitae.45 This is based upon the inde-
pendent and exclusive sovereignty of each state over ininiovables
located therein.
49
It necessarily follows that any decree by a court in a state
wherein the land is not located, cannot have the effect of an
in rem decree so as to operate ex proprio vigore upon those lands
in another jurisdiction, and create, settle, transfer or vest a
title.5 0 But it does not necessarily follow that an equity court
is wholly without jurisdiction merely because the subject matter
46Goode, Jurisdiction in Equity Over Foreign Lands, (1919) 3 St.
Louis L. Rev. 127.
-12 Black, Judgments 2nd ed., sec. 872; 1 Wharton, Conflict of Laws,
3rd ed., sec. 289a. In Davis v. Headley, (1871) 22 N. J. Eq. 115, the
chancellor said, "It is a well settled principle of law in the decisions in
England and this country, and acquiesced in by the jurists of all civilized
nations, (and thus part of the jus gentium,) that immovable property,
known to the common law as real estate, is exclusively subject to the
laws and jurisdiction of the courts of the nation or state in which it is
located. No other laws can affect it."
4sWatkins v. Holman, (1842) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 25, 10 L. Ed. 873; Haw-
ley & King v. James, (1838) 7 Paige (N.Y.) 213, 32 Am. Dec. 623;
Fall v. Fall, (1905) 75 Neb. 104, 113 N. W. 175, 121 Am. St. Rep. 767;
Caldwell v. Newton, (1917) 99 Kan. 846, 163 Pac. 163.4 9Bullock v. Bullock (1894) 52 N. J. Eq. 561, 30 Ati. 676.
501 Wharton, Conflict of Laws. 3rd ed., sec. 289a; Watts v. Waddle.
(1832) 6 Pet. (U.S.) 389, 8 L. Ed. 437; Corbett v. Nutt, (1870) 10
Wall. (U.S.) 464, 19 L. Ed. 976; Hart v. Sansom, (1884) 110 U. S.
151, 3 Sup. Ct. 586, 28 L. Ed. 101; Carpenter v. Strange, (1891) 141
U. S. 87, 11 Sup. Ct. 960, 35 L. Ed. 640.
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is located outside the territorial limits of the state. This has not
been seriously doubted since the celebrated case of Penn v. Lord
Baltinore,51 in which Lord Hardwicke, in England, decreed spe-
cific performance of an agreement concerning boundaries to lands
situated in America. In the opinion, Lord Hardwicke says that,
though a court cannot enforce its own decree in rem, this is
no objection to making the decree, for the strict primary decree
of a court of equity is in personam and could be enforced by process
of contempt in personam and sequestration, which is the proper
jurisdiction of a court of equity.
A good statement of the jurisdiction of the equity courts is
found in Mitchell v. Buich, - in which Chancellor Walworth said:
"The original and primary jurisdiction of this court was in
personam merely. The writ of assistance to deliver possession
and even sequestration to compel the performance of a decree
are comparatively of recent origin. The jurisdiction of the court
was exercised for several centuries by the simple proceeding of
attachment against the bodies of the parties, to compel obedience
to its decrees. Although the property of a defendant is beyond
the reach of the court, so that it can neither be sequestered nor
taken in execution, the court does not lose its jurisdiction in rela-
tion to that property, provided the person of the defendant is
within the jurisdiction. By the ordinary course of proceeding,
the defendant may be compelled to bring the property in dispute,
or to which the complainant claims an equitable title, within
the jurisdiction of-the court or to execute such a conveyance or
transfer thereof, as will be sufficient to vest the legal title, as well
as the possession of the property, according to the lex loci rei
sitae."
Because of the principle that equity acts in personam, where
the decree rendered will directly affect only the persons before
it, in cases of fraud, trust, or contract, which are cases properly
calling for equitable relief, the court can render a decree which
indirectly affects foreign lands.53  It is undoubtedly a settled
51(1750) 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 2 White & T., Lead. Cas. Eq. 923.
52(1831) 2 Paige (N.Y.) 606, 22 Am. Dec. 669.
Z34 Pomeroy, Equity Jurisprudence, 4th ed., sec. 1318, '*\\here the
subject matter is situated within another state or country, but the parties
are within the jurisdiction of the court, any suit may be maintained and
remedy granted which directly affect and operate upon the person of
the defendant, and not upon the subject matter, although the subject
matter is referred to in the decree, and the defendant is ordered to do
or to refrain from certain acts towards it, and it is thus ultimately but
indirectly affected by the relief granted." See Massie v. Watts, (1810)
6 Cranch (U.S.) 148, 3 L. Ed. 181; Hart v. Sansom, (1884) 110 U. S.
151, 3 Sup. Ct. 586, 28 L. Ed. 101; Carpenter v. Strange, (1891) 141
U. S. 87, 11 Sup. Ct. 960, 35 L. Ed. 640; Schmaltz v. York 'Mfg. Co.,
(1902) 204 Pa. St. 1, 53 Ath. 522.
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principle in our courts, today, that courts of equity in proper
cases, having personal jurisdiction of the parties, may decree a
conveyance of land in another state or country. 4
These decrees are directed to the parties to the suit," and are
not binding upon persons who were not within the jurisdiction
of the court.56 Neither are they an invasion of the sovereignty
of the state wherein the lands are located. 7 The decree itself.
however, will not pass title to land so located, and without a
conveyance by the party who has the legal title, will be of no
force and effect.5 8
The court has it in its power to accomplish full relief in such
cases, because of its personal jurisdiction over the parties, and to
enforce its decree by commanding the defendants to execute
a conveyance which will pass a good title to those lands according
to the lex loci rei sitae.59 This decree can be enforced by means
of sequestration, injunction, and attachment for contempt, or
other process against the defendant's person.60
511 Wharton, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., sec. 289a; Corbett v. Nutt,
(1870) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 464, 19 L. Ed. 976; Muller v. Dows, (1876)
94 U. S. 444, 449, 24 L. Ed. 207; Gardner v. Ogden, (1860) 22 N. Y.
327, 78 Am. Dec. 192.
--Pardee v. Aldridge, (1903) 189 U. S. 429. 433. 23 Sup. Ct. 514, 47
L. Ed. 883; Schmaltz v. York Mfg. Co., (1902) 204 Pa. St. 1, 53 Atd. 522.56Blackman v. Wright, (1896) 96 Iowa 541, 65 N. W. 843.571n Farley v. Shippen, (1794) Wythe (Va.) 135, the court said: "Some
of the defendants' counsel supposed that such a decree would be deemed
by our brethren of North Carolina an invasion of their sovereignty. To
this shall be allowed the full force of a good objection, if those who
urge it will prove that the sovereignty of that state would be violated
by the Virginia Court of Equity decreeing a party within its jurisdiction,
to perform an act there, which act voluntarily performed anywhere, would
not be such violation." See Hotchkiss v. Middlekauf, (1899) 96 Va.
649, 655, 32 S. E. 36, 43 L. R. A. 806.
581 Wharton, Conflict of Laws, 3rd ed., sec. 289a. In Watkins v.
Holman, (1842) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 25, 10 L. Ed. 873, McLean, Justice, at
page 56 said, "But neither the decree itself, nor any conveyance under it,
except by the person in whom the title is vested, can operate beyond thejurisdiction of the court." See Corhett v. Nutt. (1870) 10 Wall. (U.S.)
464. 19 L. Ed. 976; Fall v. Eastin, (1909) 215 U. S. 1. 30 Sup. Ct. 3,
54 L. Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 924, 17 Ann. Cas. 853; Froelich v.
Swafford, (1914) 35 S. Dak. 35, 150 N. W. 476, 893.59In Phelps v. McDonald, (1878) 99 U. S. 298, 25 L. Ed. 473, Mr.
Justice Swayne said, "Where the necessary parties are before a court
of equity, it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether it be
real or personal property, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
tribunal. It has the power to compel the defendant to do all things nec-
essary, according to the lex loci rei sitae, which he could do voluntarily,
to give full effect to the decree against him." See Mitchell v. Bunch,
(1831) 2 Paige (N.Y.) 606, 22 Am. Dee. 669; Meade v. Merritt, (1831)
2 Paige (N.Y.) 402: Winn v. Strickland, (1894) 34 Fla. 610. 16 So. 606,
6OIn Muller v. Dows, (1876) 94 U. S. 444, 449, 24 L. Ed. 207, Mr.
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It is equally clear that, in case the defendant is recalcitrant
or leaves the jurisdiction without executing the conveyance re-
quired, the court cannot execute a deed to this land which will
pass a good title, or which will be recognized by the courts of
the loci rei sitae.6' Likewise a deed by a commissioner, appointed
by the court to execute the conveyance of the property, will be
of no effect.
62
As between the parties to the suit, however, in case there is
no conveyance, the decree is conclusive of all the rights and
equities of the parties adjudicated therein, when pleaded in the
courts of the state in which the land is located, as a cause of
action or as a defense to a suit.63
Justice Strong said, "It is here undoubtedly a recognized doctrine that
a court of equity, sitting in a state and having jurisdiction of the person,
may decree a conveyance by him of land in another state, and may en-
force the decree by process against the defendant. True it cannot send
its process into that other state, nor can it deliver possession of land
in another jurisdiction, but it can command and enforce a transfer of the
title." See Penn. v. Lord Baltimore, (1750) 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 2 White
& T., Lead. Cas. Eq. 923; Newton v. Bronson, (1856) 13 N. Y. 587, 67
Am. Dec. 89.6
'Watkins v. Holman, (1842) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 25, 10 L. Ed. 873;
Corbett v. Nutt, (1870) 10 Wall. (U.S.) 464, 19 L. Ed. 976; Seixas,
Syndic. v. King, Jr., (1887) 39 La. Ann. 510, 2 So. 416; Winn v. Strick-
land, (1893) 34 Fla. 610, 16 So. 606.6 2In Watts v. Waddle, (1832) 6 Pet. (U.S.) 389, 8 L. Ed. 437, Mr.
Justice McLean in commenting about a deed given by a commissioner of
the court, at page 399, said, "A decree cannot operate beyond the state
in which the jurisdiction is exercised. It is not in the power of one
state to prescribe the mode by which real property shall be conveyed in
another. This principle is too clear to admit of doubt." See Watkins v.
Holman, (1842) 16 Pet. (U.S.) 25, 10 L- Ed. 873; Corbett v. Nutt, (1870)
10 Wall. (U.S.) 464, 19 L Ed. 976; Fall v. Eastin, (1909) 215 U. S. 1,
30 Sup. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.) 924, 17 Ann. Cas. 853.
032 Black, Judgments, 2nd ed., sec. 872, "... A chancery court in one
state, having acquired jurisdiction over the persons of the litigants, may
enforce a trust, or the specific performance of a contract, in relation to
lands situate in another state, and although the decree in such case, or
the deed of a master executed in pursuance thereof, cannot operate to
transfer the title of such lands, yet the decree is binding upon the con-
sciences of the parties, and it concludes them in respect to all matters and
things properly adjudicated and determined by the court and when the
decree in such case finds and determines the equities of the parties in re-
spect to such land, and directs a conveyance by the parties in accordance
with their equities, such decree, although no conveyance has been executed,
may be pleaded as a cause of action, or as a ground of defense, in the
courts of the state where the land is situated. And it is entitled, in the
court where so pleaded, to the force and effect of record evidence of the
equities therein determined, unless it be impeached for fraud." See also,
(1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 527.
In Burnley v. Stevenson, (1873) 24 Ohio St. 474, 15 Am. Rep. 621, the
court held that as to the decree directing the heirs to convey, the court had
jurisdiction over the parties, and the decree was in personam and bound the
consciences of those against whom it was rendered. They were bound to
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The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws"4 adopts the follow-
ing statement of this power:
"A state can exercise through its courts jurisdiction to order
or to forbid the doing of an act within the state, although to
carry out the decree may affect a thing in another state."
The following comments are listed under this statement:
"(a) A court may order a party who is subject to its juris-
diction to execute and deliver a deed of land situated in another
state. 5
convey, and this duty might have been enforced by the Kentucky court by
attachment as for contempt. The fact that the conveyance was not made
does not affect the validity of the decree so far as it determined the equit-
able rights of the parties to the land. The court also held that a decree,
rendered by a court of a sister state having jurisdiction of the parties and
the subject matter, is entitled to the same force and effect which it had in
the state where pronounced. The court then said that the courts of Ohio
could not enforce the performance of the decree by compelling the convey-
ance through its process of attachment; but said that when pleaded in the
Ohio courts as a cause of action, or as a defense, it must be regarded as
conclusive of all the rights and equities which were adjudicated therein. See
Dull v. Blackman, (1898) 169 U. S. 243, 18 Sup. Ct. 333, 42 L. Ed. 733.
Justice Mabry, in Winn v. Strickland, (1894) 34 Fla. 610, 16 So. 606,
said, "Although the decree in such case cannot of itself operate to transfer
the title to lands situated out of the state, yet it is binding upon the con-
sciences of the parties, and may conclude them in respect to all matters prop-
erly adjudicated and determined by the court. Such is the effect given to
foreign judgments and decrees by the constitution of the United States in
providing that full faith and credit shall be given in each state to the judicial
proceedings of another state and the act of congress directing the manner in
which such proceedings shall be proved, and the effect thereof." See Seixas,
Syndic. v. King, Jr., (1887) 39 La. Ann. 510, 2 So. 416.
Dunlap v. Byers, (1896) 110 Mich. 109, 67 N. W. 1067, holds that tile
questions which were adjudicated cannot be reopened in the courts of the
state wherein the land is located and the findings of the court are res
adjudicata. See Vaught v. Meador, (1901) 99 Va. 569, 39 S. E. 225, 86
Am. St. Rep. 908.
In Justice Holmes' special concurring opinion to the case of Fall v.
Eastin, (1909) 215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3, 54 L. Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A.
(N.S.) 924, 17 Ann. ,Cas. 853, he says that the Washington decree estab-
lished a personal obligation between the parties. "A personal decree is
equally within the jurisdiction of a court having the persons within its
power, whatever its ground and whatever it orders the defendant to do.
Therefore I think that this decree was entitled to full faith and credit in
Nebraska, but the Nebraska court carefully avoids saying that the decree
would not be binding between the original parties had the husband been
before the court." He then says that the decision is affirmed because they
regard the decree as imposing no obligation upon a purchaser with notice,
and that the decision, even if wrong, did not deny the Washington decree
its full effect. See dissenting opinion of Chief Justice Sedgwick in Fall
v. Fall, (1905) 75 Neb. 104, 113 N. W. 175, 121 Am. St. Rep. 767; but see
Froelich v. Swafford, (1914) 35 S. Dak. 35, 150 N. W. 476 & 893.
64Restatement No. 2, Conflict of Laws, sec. 102, p. 80.
65Illustration: "A brings suit against B in New York for specific per-
formance of a contract to convey land in Connecticut, and B is served with
process. The court may order the conveyance."
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"(b) If the land can be transferred only by act done by the
defendant within the state where the land is,"' the court of an-
other state has no jurisdiction to order him to transfer the land.,r
"(c) A court will not order a conveyance of land in another
state if, as a preliminary to the conveyance, the court must, ac-
cording to its laws, order an inspection or valuation.""t
In regard to the application of the full faith and credit clause
to equitable decrees for the conveyance of foreign land, two
different views have been taken by the writers. The old orthodox
view, that an equitable decree only binds the person to obedience
to the court and does not operate at all upon the matter in ques-
tion, and that the equitable decree is not by law equal to a
judgment, is taken by one group,"° while the other view, that a
court of equity is a legal tribunal with power to adjudicate and
settle controversies as finally as a court of law,-- is taken by
some modem writers who are anxious to get away from the old
dogma.
The orthodox view ' concedes that a decree for the payment
of money will be recognized and enforced in another state for
the amounts already due, but, as to future payments, such present
decree is not conclusive, for there is no debt and, consequently,
there are no existing rights of action. "
As to the power of equity courts to decree a conveyance of
foreign lands, this view limits the power to those situations in
which there is an antecedent obligation by the law of the situs,
66As to whether a court of equity, having personal jurisdiction over
the defendant, could order him to perform an act in another state, see a
discussion of the principles involved under topic 3 of this article.71llustration: "Land in state X can be transferred only by livery of
seisin where the land lies. A sues B in state Y for specific performance
of a contract to convey land in X, and B is served with process. The court
will not order the conveyance." It is to be noted that no court will know-
ingly make a decree which is contrary to the laws of the lex loci rei sitae.
Waterhouse v. Stansfield, (1852) 10 Hare 254; see also (1922) 35 Harv.
L. Rev. 610.68lllustration: "A petition is filed in a court of state X for partition
of lands in state Y. By the law of X a partition is granted only after an
officer of the court has viewed and appraised the land and recommended
a division of the land or a sale. The court will not order a partition."
69Langdell, Summary of Equity Pleading, 2nd ed., (1883) 37, sec. 43,
n. 4.
7OBarbour, The Extra-Territorial Effect of the Equitable Decree,
(1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 527; Cook, The Powers of Courts of Equity
(1915) 15 Col. L. Rev. 37, 106, 228.71See (1908) 21 Harv. L. Rev. 210.72The Restatement of the Conflict of" Laws, Tentative Draft No. 5,
has apparently adopted the orthodox view. In se(. 483 it is stated that
no right created by a judgment, except a judgment for the payment of
money, will be enforced in another state by action on the judgment.
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as otherwise the decree would be without force, for it cannot
create an obligation as to land outside its jurisdiction. The en-
forcement of a contract to convey specific land and the enforce-
ment of a trust in regard to specific land are examples of
antecedent obligations. There exists little dispute about an equity
court's power to act in these situations. An example of an obli-
gation which is not antecedent would be where a court, in a divorce
proceeding, orders one of the parties to convey foreign lands.
It is at this point that the dispute arises.
Professor Ernest G. Lorenzen, in an article discussing the
relative merits of the two views,713 says that the full faith and
credit clause applies only to substantive rights and not to matters
of procedure, so that, if the equitable decree does not establish
an obligation, that is, a right-duty relation, but is merely a method
for enforcement of existing legal relations, the decree does not
come within the purview of the full faith and credit clause. In
this article, an early statement by Professor Beale is cited,7 1
in which he takes the position that an equitable decree, which
does not rest upon an antecedent obligation, does not create sub-
stantive rights, but creates only a personal duty toward the court
rendering the decree.
This view has been criticized by Professor Barbour 7" and by
Professor Cook,7 6 on the theory that to adopt this view is to
assume that equity has made no progress since the time of
Coke.
Professor Lorenzen, citing cases and authority, proceeds to
show that equitable decrees for the payment of money have been
recognized in other states as res judicata, as merging the original
cause of action, and as creating an equitable right which may be
enforced in other jurisdictions by a new suit. Those subscrib-
ing to the orthodox view contend that effect is given to foreign
73(1925) 34 Yale L. J. 591.
743 Beale, Summary of the Conflict of Laws, Cases on the Conflict of
Laws, (1902) 536, 537.
75(1919) 17 Mich. L. Rev. 528, 539, 544: "When a judge sitting in
equity today declares that a foreign decree ordering the conveyance of land
creates no obligation, but merely a duty owed by the defendant to the
court, he is assuming that equity has made no progress since the time of
Coke.... " "The notion that an equitable decree which orders the
conveyance of land cannot create a binding obligation is the last survival
of an old dogma which is today shorn of most of its force...." "So
far then as the power of a court of equity is concerned, there appears to
be no reason why a foreign decree should not create a binding obligation
though it concern mediately domestic land."
76(1915) 15 'Col. L. Rev. 228, 233.
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equitable decrees for the payment of money, because, by legisla-
tion, they have been placed upon the same footing as judgments
at Iaw and not because the new obligation created by the equitable
decree arises from principles of equity.
Professor Lorenzen cites cases which uphold the position that
since 1873 decrees for the conveyance of land have been regarded
by our courts as res judicata, and that, if pleaded as a basis or cause
of action or defense in the courts of other states, they are entitled
to the force and effect of record evidence of the equities therein.
These decrees create equitable duties which will be recognized
and enforced in other states, including the state in which the land
is situated. Because the decree is conclusive evidence of the
defendant's duty to convey, and binding on the defendant, whether
right or wrong, he says that it is the foreign decree itself which
is being enforced in the other state, and not the original cause
of action.7 7  He further says that since actions at law lie to
enforce legal obligations created by foreign judgments, there is
no inherent reason why a bill in equity should not be available
to enforce obligations created by foreign equitable decrees, since
in modern law they create equitable rights.
After submitting that Mr. Justice Holmes, in Fall z. Eastin,3
gives the key to the final solution of the problem, 0 Professor
Lorenzen says that under the full faith and credit clause, the
obligation imposed by a foreign decree is, as between the parties,
binding upon the courts of sister states, but not binding, under
the federal constitution, upon third parties including third parties
with notice of the foreign decree. Whether foreign equitable
decrees will be recognized by the courts of the situs as to such
third parties will depend upon the policy of the particular state.
Since there is no inherent difference between equitable decrees
for the payment of money and equitable decrees for the doing
of some other act, since between courts of this country, as much
effect should be given to judgments or decrees of a sister state,
apart from the requirements of the full faith and credit clause,
as is consistent with the interests of the forum, and since a con-
veyance of lands, made under the compulsion of a decree of a
court of equity of another state, is recognized, it would seen
as though the decree itself should be recognized in the state
77But see (1908) 21 Harv. L. Rev. 210.
78(1909) 215 U. S. 1, 30 Sup. Ct. 3, 54 L Ed. 65, 23 L. R. A. (N.S.)
924, 17 Ann. Cas. 853.
79See note 63.
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wherein the land is located, in cases where the defendant has
left the state without complying with it. He has had his day in
court and there is no reason for allowing him to litigate the mat-
ters over again.80
III
THE POWER OF A COURT OF EQUITY To RESTRAIN OR COMPEL
THE DOING OF SOME ACT OUTSIDE THE TERRITORIAL
LIMITS OF THE STATE
The Restatement is in accord with the proposition that equity
courts have power to enjoin trespass on foreign lands. The rule
adopted therein is that a state can exercise, through its courts,
jurisdiction to forbid a person who is subject to its jurisdiction
to do an act in another state."1  The comment8 2 on this rule is
that the decree can be obeyed by remaining within the state which
issues the decree, and, therefore, the decree will not at all affect
conditions in the other state.
In an article83 by Professor Beale8 4 the same view is ex-
pressed. As examples of this view he cites the case of Alexander
v. Tolleston Club,85 in which an injunction was issued by the
Illinois court preventing the defendant from interfering with a
right of way claimed by the plaintiff over lands in Indiana; the
case of Philadelphia Co. v. Stinson,8" in which an injunction was
granted restraining the defendant from causing criminal proceed-
ings to be instituted in Pennslyvania against the plaintiff; and
French v. Maguire, 7 in which the defendant was enjoined from
exhibiting a drama in California in violation of plaintiff's rights
in that drama.
Other cases in support of this doctrine are Great Falls Manzi-
facturing Co. v. Worster, s in which a citizen of New Hamp-
shire was restrained from going into Maine and there committing
acts injurious to the property of plaintiff situated there; Munson
8OThese conclusions are in substance those adopted by Professor Loren-
zen. 81Restatement No. 2, Conflict of Laws, sec. 101, p. 87; see also (1918)
31 Harv. L. Rev. 646.82Restatement No. 2, Conflict of Laws, p. 87.
83(1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 293 et seq.
84Reporter of Restatement of the Conflict of Laws.
85(1884) 110 Il. 65.
86(1912) 223 U. S. 605, 32 Sup. Ct. 340, 56 L. Ed. 570.
87(1878) 55 How. Pr. (N.Y.) 471.
88(1851) 23 N. H. 462.
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v. Tryon,"9 where defendant was restrained from committing
acts of trespass and waste on lands outside the jurisdiction of the
court; and Jennings v. Beale, °0 where the defendant, because of
a contract with the plaintiff, was enjoined from committing tres-
pass upon mining lands located outside the jurisdiction of the
court.
In Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Wcstern and Atlantic
R. R.,91 plaintiff sought to restrain the defendant from connect-
ing wires to plaintiff's poles and lines running from Tennessee
to Georgia. The court granted the relief in so far as the defendant
or its agents were within the state of Tennessee, but refused
it as to the part in Georgia, saying that it would not make a
decree which it could not enforce by its own authority, and which
would be mere words, having no sanction by way of making them
effective. It is submitted, however, that the court could have com-
pelled the defendant to execute a bond,92 or could have sequestered
the defendant's property within the state of Tennessee. Therefore,
the court would not be powerless to punish for contempt as it
assumed that it was. It is also submitted that lack of power to
enforce the decree may be a reason against entertaining juris-
diction, but it has nothing to do with the validity of the decree
when made.93  In order to compel performance of the decree,
it is not necessary that the defendant have property within the
state which could be sequestered," nor is it necessary that the
court have power to enforce the decree in ren 5
An injunction was sought in Kirklin v. Atlas Savings and
Loan Association96 to restrain defendant from interfering with
plaintiff's possession of lands in Georgia, and for the removal of
its claims as a cloud upon their right thereto. The dictum of
Wilson, J., was to the effect that the mere fact that the land
was in Georgia interposed no objection to granting the relief
89(1867) 6 Phila. Rep. 395.
90(1893) 158 Pa. St. 283, 27 Ati. 948.
93(1874) 8 Baxter (Tenn.) 54.
92(1921) 30 Yale L. J. 865.
93Michigan Trust Co. v. Ferry, (1912) 228 U. S. 346, 33 Sup. Ct. 550,
57 L. Ed. 867; Frick v. Hartford Life Ins. Co., (1922) 98 Conn. 251, 119
AtI. 229; March v. Eastern Ry., (1860) 40 N. H. 548, 77 Am. Dec. 732;
but see White v. White, (1835) 7. G. & J. (Md.) 208.94Arglasse v. Muschamp, (1682) 1. Vern. 77,135; but see Wicks v.
Caruthers, (1884) 13 Lea (Tenn.) 353.
95Massie v. Watts, (1810) 6 Cranch (U.S.) 148, 3 L Ed. 181; Penn
v. Lord Baltimore, (1750) 1 Ves. Sr. 444, 2 White & T., Lead. Cas. Eq.
923; Johnson v. Kimbro, (1859) 3 Head (Tenn.) 557, 75 Am. Dec. 781.
96(1900) (Tenn. Chan. App. 1900) 60 S. W. 149.
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sought, the court having jurisdiction over the person of the
defendant. He said:
. "In other words, where the proper parties are before the
court, and a propen case is made out by the evidence, it is no
objection to its action that the res, the subject matter of the con-
troversy, whether it be real or personal property, is without the
state; and it has the power to compel the defendant to do all
things appropriate to carry out its decree."
The relief was refused in this case because the evidence (lid not
warrant it.
Butterfield v. Nogales Copper Co.,97 was a case where the
relief sought was that defendant be enjoined from selling, encum-
bering, and in any manner disposing of property situated in
Mexico. Sloan, J., said:
"It is a settled doctrine that a court of equity, having acquired
jurisdiction over the person of the defendant, has jurisdiction to
enter any decree which may concern or affect lands situated in
a foreign state to the same extent and as fully as though these
were situated within the state where the court has its situs."
In another case9 an injunction was granted restraining the de-
fendant from interfering with plaintiff's right to cut and remove
timber in Arkansas.
In a discussion9" of the situation where courts of equity are
called upon to enjoin a foreign trespass, the case of Lindsley v.
Union Silver Star Mining Co.,'00 is discussed. Relief, in this case,
was refused on the ground that possession of a foreign mining lode
was the foundation of the controversy and was not merely incidental
to the enforcement of a contract, or trust, or relief from fraud.
Since the property, the possession of which was in controversy,
was located in another state, the action, in its essence, was local.
In the discussion the view is taken that the case is based upon the
analogy of an almost universal rule of law, which has its origin
in a distinction between local and transitory actions, that an action
will not lie for injuries to foreign real estate.'01 The result is
criticised inasmuch as the plaintiff is greatly hindered in ob-
97(1905) 9 Ariz. 212, 80 Pac. 345.
9 8Anderson-Tully Co. v. Thompson, (1915) 132 Tenn. 80, 177 S. W. 66.
09(1902) 15 Harv. L. Rev. 579.
100(1901) 26 Wash. 301, 66 Pac. 382.
'
0 The Restatement of the Conflict of Laws, Tentative Draft No.
5, Sec. 624, apparently with reluctance, adopts the rule that no action
can be maintained in one state to recover compensation for a trespass
upon or injury to land in another state. But see, Little v. Chicago,
etc., Ry., (1896) 65 Minn. 48, 67 N. W. 846, 33 L. R. A. 423, 60 Am.
St. Rep. 421. See also (1920) 5 MINNESOTA LAW REvIEW 63.
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tamining adequate remedy, and it is deemed wiser to disregard
the common law rule, to which equity is not generally committed,
and to grant the relief which equity has power to give.
A more serious problem-is encountered when a court of equity
is called upon to make a decree which by its terms is to be carried
out in another state.
The Restatement expressly says that a state cannot exercise,
through its courts, jurisdiction to make a decree which by its
terms is to be carried out in another state, except in cases where
it orders a person subject to its jurisdiction to institute proceed-
ings in a court or other governmental agency in another state, or
to defend or appear in such proceedings. 0 -
It is at this point that the authorities differ. Two conflicting
views are expressed, the one adopted by the Restatement, that
an equity court lacks jurisdiction to act; the other that it is
merely a matter of discretion in the court as to whether they will
act or not and that it is not at all a question of jurisdiction.
The reason given by the Restatement in support of the view
there adopted is that, if the court commands an act to be done, it
expressly interferes with the course of conduct in the territory
of another state.10 3 Professor Beale in his article"" expresses
the same view as that adopted by the Restatement, sa)ing that,
according to the generally accepted doctrine, a court of equity will
order no act, not even a ministerial act, to be done outside the
territory over which the court has power.
As has been stated before, the reasons given for refusing to
order a positive act in another state are, first, the inability to
enforce the decree, and, second, the interference with the sov-
ereignty of the other state.10 5
It has been contended 8 that interference with the sovereignty
of the other state is a circumstance appealing to the discretion of
the chancellor rather than a bar to the jurisdiction, and although
in a particular case it may be so great as to be a ground for denying
relief, it should not be used as a solving phrase. As solutions to
the objection that the court is unable to enforce the decree, it has
been suggested that the act be done by agent, that the defendant's
property within the state be sequestered, and that the defendant
10 2Restatement-No. 2, Conflict of Laws, Sec. 99, p. 84.
'"'Commentaries on Conflict of Laws, Restatement No. 2, p. 27.304(1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 293 et seq.
105(1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 610; (1917) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 646.
106(1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 610.
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put up a bond to secure performance.'" It is submitted that any of
these methods will enable the court sufficiently to enforce its de-
crees to the plaintiff's satisfaction.
To determine which of these two positions is the correct one,
a study of the cases, in which such relief was asked, is essential,
a study not only of the cases in which positive action was asked,
but also of those in which, to carry out effectively the terms of
the decree, a positive act in another state was necessary.
Madden v. Rosseter'0 8 was a case in which the plaintiff, a resi-
dent of New York, and the defendant, a resident of California,
were joint owners of a thoroughbred stallion. The defendant had
the possession and use of the stallion in California during the
seasons of 1919 and 1920 under an agreement whereby plaintiff
was to have him for use in Kentucky during the seasons of 1921
and 1922. At the opening of the 1921 season plaintiff sued in
New York praying a mandatory injunction ordering the de-
fendant to ship the stallion to Kentucky, and the appointment of a
receiver with power to proceed to California to get tho stallion.
The defendant was personally served with process in New York
and appeared by an attorney. In granting the relief sought, Ford,
J., said:
"Plaintiff's rights have been prejudiced, and further irrepar-
able damage is threatening him. There must be a remedy, and I
do not believe this court is powerless to give it to him. The relief
prayed for seems to be the most practicable and appropriate which
is available to him."
As to the difficulty of enforcing this decree, should the defendant
refuse to comply with it, the court said that the courts of sister
states may be relied upon to aid in serving the ends of justice when-
ever its own process falls short of effectiveness. In a review
of this case'0 9 the view is taken that where the defendant would
be required to go into a foreign jurisdiction, and there do affirma-
tive acts, relief may be denied upon the grounds of expediency,
since interference with a foreign sovereignty is undesirable, and
since theoretically the decree would become unenforceable upon
the departure of the defendant, though the latter difficulty may
be eliminated by requiring him to act by agent or by requiring
bond. The writer further states that the more recent tendency
o'0(1921) 30 Yale L. J. 865; (1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 610.
208(1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 416, 187 N. Y. S. 462, aff'd (1921) 196
App. Div. 891. 187 N. Y. S. 943.
109(1921) 30 Yale L. J. 865.
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is to attach less weight to these difficulties.110  Another
writer"' justifies the case because of the peculiar facts in the case
which warranted the relief, and because of the fact that had
application been made to the California courts for a decree to
deliver the stallion in Kentucky, it would be just as objectionable
as that of the New York court, since to compel the defendant
to do his full duty would have been to command an act in another
state.
In KempsonL v. Keimpson," 2 plaintiff and defendant, wife and
husband, had a matrimonial domicile in New Jersey. The de-
fendant left New Jersey and went to North Dakota for the purpose
of obtaining a divorce, and there falsely stated that he had resided
there for three months. The plaintiff sought to enjoin further
prosecution of the action, and the New Jersey court issued the
injunction, yet the defendant disregarded it, and later obtained a
decree in North Dakota. Later he was attached in New Jersey,
fined for contempt, and put in jail. The decree required the
defendant to present the truth to the North Dakota court which
rendered the decree, and in good faith urge that its decree be set
aside. This case has been criticized as being an unwarranted de-
parture from the settled principle, 13 and has been justified by the
Restatement, under section 100,1 which is to the effect that a state
can exercise, through its courts, jurisdiction to order a person
subject to its jurisdiction to institute proceedings in a court or
other governmental agency in another state, or to defend or appear
in such proceedings." 5
In both of the above cases it cannot be denied that the court
commanded the defendant to do affirmative acts in another state.
In Madden v. Rosseter,"6 the defendant was ordered to ship the
11°See also (1917) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 117.
"'1(1922) 35 Harv. L. Rev. 610.
112(1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 At. 360, 625, 58 L. R. A. 484, 92 Am.
St. Rep. 682.
"3(1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 293 et seq.
"14Restatement No. 2, Conflict of Laws, sec. 100, p. 86.
115In the Commentaries on Conflict of Laws, Restatement No. 2,
sec. 100, p. 27, it is stated, "Where, however, a state opens its tribunals
to all parties who have suffered legal wrong or who have a claim upon
things within the state, it is no international offense to that state to
order a person to take advantage of the offer of the state and enter the
tribunal. It has therefore always been held that a court may properly
order a defendant to institute a suit in the court of another state or
to make any proper application to that court."
116(1921) 114 Misc. Rep. 416, 187 N. Y. S. 462, aff'd. (1921) 196
App. Div. 891, 187 N. Y. S. 943.
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stallion from California to Kentucky, which was the principal
relief sought. The incidental relief granted was that a receiver
be appointed with power to proceed to California to get the
stallion. The Kempson Case"117 can be explained upon the principle
adopted by the Restatement, although it clearly appears that the
defendant will have to do affirmative acts in North Dakota to
comply with the decree. It is interesting to note that in the
Kempson Case the court merely required the effort on the part of
the defendant to comply with the terms of the decree."18
The relief sought in People of New York 'v. Central R. R.'11
was abatement of a nuisance in New Jersey. The New York
court refused to abate the nuisance1 0 on the ground that, if it
granted the abatement order, and New Jersey refused to comply
with the terms, it would then have to send a sheriff to execute
the judgment and it could not protect him or punish persons who
resisted him. The court then said that such a judgment must be
utterly void for want of jurisdiction in the court to render the
same.12' If the only objection to the jurisdiction in this case is the
lack of power to enforce the decree, it seems as though this could
be obviated. Since the court had personal jurisdiction over the
defendant, it could order the defendant to act by agent, sequester
its property within the state, or compel it to execute a bond to
secure performance of the decree.
In a number of the western states, in cases involving rights
to water from interstate streams for irrigation purposes, the relief
granted frequently called for affirmative acts in another state.
In California Development Co. v. New Liverpool Salt Co., (The
Salton Sea Cases),"2 the defendant negligently constructed intakes
"17(1902) 63 N. J. Eq. 783, 52 Atl. 360, 625, 58 L. R. A. 484, 92 Am.
St. Rep. 682.
118Dixon, J., said, "Only the court that rendered the decree can
vacate it. True, if a party be commanded by the court to do a certain
thing, and afterwards he satisfies the court that he has not the power
to do it, the court will ordinarily relieve him from the order. But when
it appears at the outset that the thing to be done is not within the
control of the party to be enjoined, but yet that his effort may induce
its accomplishment, a more reasonable course for the court is to
require the effort, not the result. We therefore think that this part
of the order should be modified so as to require the defendant to
present the truth to the court of North Dakota, and in good faith urge
that its decree be set aside. When that is shown to have been done,
and the fine and costs have been paid, the defendant should be released."
119(1870) 42 N. Y. 283. See (1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 646.
120 See Mississippi & Missouri R. R. v. Ward, (1862) 2 Black (U. S.)
845.
121See (1904) 17 Harv. L. Rev. 572.
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from the Colorado river both in California and Mexico, so that.
when heavy rains and floods came, the lands of plaintiff, located
in the Salton Basin, were flooded, and he was damaged. Plain-
tiff sought an injunction to restrain the defendant from diverting
said waters unless suitable headgates were provided. The court
enjoined the defendant from taking any more water than was
necessary and from permitting waste waters to run back into
the Salton Basin. The defendant objected to the court's juris-
diction to require it to erect headgates in Mexico, which was
the only effective and permanent means of controlling the river.
Morrow, J., said :123
"The injury charged in the present case was an injury to
property within the jurisdiction of the court, and the party
charged with the commission, of the injury was also within the
jurisdiction of the court. The cause of the injury was not serv-
ing a useful purpose for any one, and the relief asked for was
that the party causing the injury might be enjoined from con-
tinuing to injure complainant's property within the jurisdiction
of the court. Why may not a court restrain a party over whom it
has jurisdiction from injuring property within its jurisdiction?
How does it affect the question of jurisdiction or venue to say that
the party on whom the court must act may find it necessary to do
things outside the jurisdiction of the court in order to comply with
the order of the court? May this not often happen, and would it
not happen oftener, if it were determined that such an excuse was
sufficient to defeat the jurisdiction of the court?"
The Restatement justifies this case by saying that an in-
junction may be granted against the doing of an act within the
state, even though the party enjoined can obey the injunction by
acting in another state or causing an act to be done there.1 1
Professor Beale, adopting a similar view, said, in a review of this
case :125
"The case seems rightly decided on the facts; and it is no
real extension of principle. The relief asked is an injunction;
and, as has been seen, an injunction may always be granted against
doing an act abroad. Here the act abroad injures land within
the jurisdiction of the court, and the act is therefore tortious by
our law. If in such a case the defendant has by his wrongful
conduct put himself into a position where he cannot refrain from
further tort, except by doing some act abroad, it is his own
affair; the court merely enjoins the continuance of the tort."
122(C.A.A. 9th Cir. 1909) 172 Fed. 792, certiorari denied, 215 U. S.
603, 30 Sup. Ct. 405, 54 L. Ed. 345.
'
2^ 3At p. 813.
124Restatement No. 2, Conflict of Laws, sec. 102, sub. sec. e, p. 90.
125(1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 293 et seq.
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As to the power of the courts to grant such relief under such
circumstances and facts there can be little doubt. On principle,
such decree is necessary to protect property within the jurisdiction
of the court, and also to do justice in the case.
Still another explanation has been made of the court's juris-
diction to render the decree in the Salton Sea Cases. Advocates
of this view take the position that the decree was negative in its
nature, -126 and, therefore, the limitation on the jurisdiction of the
court was merely a question of expediency. 27  The question
which presents itself under this position is whether the jurisdiction
is to be determined by the form of the decree. If the decree must
be expressed in the affirmative, and calls for the doing of affirma-
ti-,e acts outside the jurisdiction of the court, is that a limitation
on the jurisdiction of the court? If the decree can be expressed in
the negative, even though to carry out the decree affirmative acts
have to be performed outside the jurisdiction, is it merely a matter
of discretion as to whether the court will act or not, and not a
question of jurisdiction at all? Could it be possible that in order
to protect local property from injury, where such injury could only
be remedied by the doing of some affirmative act outside the state,
that the decree would be void if it expressly ordered such act to
be done, yet good if it merely ordered the defendant to refrain
from committing the injury to this land, although the only possible
way of complying with the decree would be by some act which the
court ordered in granting the affirmative relief ? Could a difference
in the form of the decree determine the jurisdiction of the court
to act under such circumstances? It is submitted that it could
not, and that the form of the decree is not a test of the jurisdiction
of the court.
In Rickey Land and Cattle Co. v. Miller & Lux,12 18 the plaintiff
owned lands in Nevada and used the water from the Walker river
for irrigation purposes. The defendant owned lands in California
126(1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 646; (1910) 23 Ilarv. L. Rcv. 390.
1
2 71n (1910) 23 Harv. L. Rev. 390, it was said, "So the defendant
in the suit could not successfully plead lack of jurisdiction; and the
prevention of local injury fully justified a decree which the court knew
would indirectly lead to affirmative action in Mexico. It is seen, there-
fore, that the limitation on the power of a court of equity arising from
a foreign situs of the property in controversy is, in cases of affirmative
relief, absolute, because of the resulting lack of jurisdiction in the
sovereign state; while if negative relief is sought, the limitation becomes
a mere question of expeliency."
12(C.C.D. Nev. 1904) 127 Fed. 573; (C.C.D. Nev. 1906) 146 Fed.
574; (C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1907) 152 Fed. 11.
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and used water from this same river. The plaintiff brought
suit in the federal court in Nevada, seeking to enjoin the defend-
ant from diverting water from the said river above the points
where the plaintiff so diverts the same in such manner or to
such extent as to deprive plaintiff of any of the water which he
claimed by prior appropriations. The defendant's defense was
that he had a right by the law of riparian rights existing in
California and by appropriation. After a temporary injunction
had been issued against him, he brought suit in California against
the plaintiff, to establish his prior right. Plaintiff then brought
suit in the federal court in Nevada to enjoin prosecution of this
suit, and the injunction was granted on the ground that the
issues presented were the same and the Nevada federal court
had acquired jurisdiction before the California action was begun.
On the appeal of this case to the United States Supreme Court,' 0
the decision was affirmed. Mr. Justice Holmes said:
"We are of the opinion, therefore, that there was concurrent
jurisdiction in the two courts, and that the substantive issues
in the Nevada and California suits were so far the same that
the court first seised should proceed to the determination without
interference, on the principles now well settled as between courts
of the United States and of the state."
In the Nevada federal court, the basis of the decision was
that this was a wrongful diversion of the water by the plaintiff
in California,' ° and it is upon this ground that the Restatement
justifies the case. Under section 102, which deals with a case
where a court makes an order which is practically certain to
involve the doing of an act in another state, it is said :3'
"If, however, the act must be done simply because the defend-
ant had, by his own wrong, put himself in a position where he
cannot avoid acting in the other state or doing a wrong in the
state where the court sits, that court should not be ousted of its
jurisdiction to prevent a wrong being committed within its terri-
tory merely because the defendant is likely, in obeying the
injunction, to do an act elsewhere. It is not really the court
which orders the act, but the defendant's illegal act which has
placed him in an unfortunate position. '13 -2
The Supreme Court, in its decision, did not pass upon the
question as to whether or not the act was wrongful, but affirmed
129(1910) 218 U. S. 258, 31 Sup. Ct. 11, 54 L. Ed. 1032.
130(C.C.D. Nev. 1904) 127 Fed. 573, 586.
23lCommentaries on Conflict of Laws, Restatement No. 2, sec. 102.
p. 27.
1
32 See also (1913) 26 Harv. L. Rev. 283, 293 et seq.
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the decision on the sole ground that where there was concurrent
jurisdiction the first to acquire jurisdiction retained it.
The objection to holding this to be a wrongful act is that
it assumes the whole question of jurisdiction. According to Cali-
fornia law, the plaintiff's acts were not wrongful, and to say
that they were is to assume that Nevada had jurisdiction over
the whole matter. Clearly, according to Nevada law, the plain-
tiff was entitled to have the defendant enjoined from diverting
water in California from this stream. To accomplish this result,
it was necessary for the defendant to do affirmative acts in Cali-
fornia. If there had been a direct injury to this land in Nevada,
caused by a wrongful act of the defendant outside the state, the
case could be explained in the same way as the Salton Sea Cases
-that to prevent an injury to land within the state, caused by
the wrongful conduct of defendant outside the state, the defend-
ant can be enjoined from further tort, even though it will require
positive action by him in another state. Here, of course, it can
be argued that local land is injured because of its depreciation
in value caused by the defendant's acts in California, but there
is not a direct positive injury to lands as in the Salton Sea Cases.
We then have a situation in which a court of equity is asked
to prevent an injury to local land caused by a rightful act in
another state. It would be clear that had this act by defendant
:n California been wrongful, the Nevada court, having jurisdic-
tion over the parties, could enjoin such wrongful act, even to the
extent of causing defendant to do positive acts in another state.
It has been stated that had two states similar laws as to the rights
to water from interstate streams, it would clearly be within the
jurisdiction of the court of the state in which the injury occurred
to determine the parties' rights in the case,1 33 as in that case the
relative rights of appropriators of water from interstate streams
would be the same. 34
133(1911) 73 Cent. L. J. 189, 190.
134No attempt is here made further to explain this case. as to do
so would be to go into the whole law of water rights in the western
states to determine finally who shall say whether an act is wrongful.
and, as between upper and lower states, which rights shall be superior.
It will suffice to state the problem in connection therewith.
In the western states there e-ist two systems of water law:
(1) The riparian system, which holds that each riparian owner
has an equal right to make a reasonable use of the waters of the stream,
subject to the equal right of the other riparian owners likewise to make
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Viwyard Land and Stock Co. v. Twin Falls S. R. L. &
W. Co.,'-- was a suit commenced in Idaho to determine conflicting
water rights alleged by the parties to have been acquired by prior
appropriations. It appears that the defendant's land was situated
in Nevada and the plaintiff's in Idaho. The defendant challenged
the court's jurisdiction to decree that they use the waters only
upon certain lands; that they install automatic measuring devices
in their canals and ditches; that plaintiffs shall have the right
perpetually to go upon defendant's land in Nevada for the pur-
pose of inspecting such devices; and that defendant keep records
of the amount of water diverted. It was held that where the
defendant has been personally served and appears in the court he
may be enjoined from doing things in another state to the detri-
ment of plaintiff's rights, and although the court by its decree
cannot directly affect the property in Nevada, it can, acting in
personam, coerce action respecting it. Wolverton, J., said :"'
"It is furthermore necessary, to protect the plaintiff against
encroachments of the defendant, that the water be measured. The
proper measurement is a duty personal to the defendant. It is
altogether appropriate, therefore, that the court impose upon the
defendant the obligation of installing automatic measuring de-
vices, and, for the protection of the plaintiff, these should be
subject to their inspection. So it is respecting rules regulating the
manner of diverting, measuring, and distributing the water and
the keeping of records of the amount of water diverted, etc. These
were all directions of the court operating in personam and not
a reasonable use. This does not depend upon priority of time.
(2) The appropriation system, which holds that the water user
who first puts to beneficial use the water of a stream acquires thereby
the first right to the water, to the extent reasonably necessary to his
use, and that he who is second to put water to beneficial use acquires
second right, and so on.
The question then is, in case of dispute between two states having
conflicting systems dr even the same systems of water law, who is to
decide as to the use of water from an interstate stream? It is doubtful
if Congress has the authority to establish a principle for the settlement
of an interstate stream controversy, because of the constitutional limi-
tations on its power. The Supreme Court of the United States, by
reason of the power given it by the constitution, has jurisdiction over
the controversies between states, and necessarily is the tribunal which
must finally determine the relative rights to the use of water from
interstate streams by citizens of different states. For a discussion of
this problem and of the cases of Kansas v. Colorado, (1907) 206 U. S.
46, 27 Sup. Ct. 655, 51 L. Ed. 956, and Wyoming v. Colorado, (1922)
259 U. S. 419, 42 Sup. Ct. 552, 66 L. Ed. 999, see (1923) 36 Harv. L.
Rev. 960.
135(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1917) 245 Fed. 9.
136Vineyard Land and Stock Co. v. Twin Falls S. R. L. & W. Co.,
(C.C.A. 9th Cir. 1917) 245 Fed. 9, 29.
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directly upon the res, and were and are within the courts equitable
jurisdiction to determine and declare."
It has been contended' 37 that the rule against interfering with a
foreign sovereign precludes a court of equity from ordering
affirmative action outside its jurisdiction, but that this case is a
real exception, where the court, to prevent a domestic tort, ordered
the defendant to take affirmative action in a foreign jurisdiction
as the only efficient means of prevention. After stating that the
case represents a culmination of a tendency evinced in the de-
cisions of the federal courts for the past decade to disregard
state lines when, in the interest of efficient administration of
justice, it is necessary to do so, the writer said that that part of
the decree which gave the plaintiff a right to go on lands and
inspect the meters was an in rem decree affecting a foreign res
directly, and was an interference with a foreign sovereign, and
could not be supported.
The question which arises here is whether plaintiff, while in
the act of inspecting the meters on land of defendant in Nevada,
would have a good defense to an action of trespass brought
against him by the defendant in Nevada. If he set up the decree
of the Idaho court as a defense to the action, would the Nevada
courts be bound to recognize it and give it full faith and credit?
As has been previously pointed out, the effect of an equitable
decree in a suit for the conveyance of foreign lands, as between
the parties, is conclusive of all the rights and equities of the
parties adjudicated therein, when pleaded in the courts of the
state in which the land is located, either as a cause of action or
as a defense to a suit.1 38
A decree in the present case certainly does not interfere with
the sovereign's exclusive jurisdiction over land situated within
its territorial limits any more than does a decree by a court com-
manding a conveyance of title to foreign land. If the courts of
the loci rei sitae are bound, under the full faith and credit clause,
to give effect to the rights and equities of the parties adjudicated in
this latter case, why should they not be equally bound when the
decree of another court is introduced as a defense, and shows that
the equities determined in the suit in the other state entitle the
plaintiff to go on the lands without subjecting himself to an action
of trespass ?
1'3(1918) 31 Harv. L. Rev. 646.
13SSee note 63 above. See also (1911) 73 Cent. L, J. 189.
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In Consolidated Rendering Co. v. Verinont,'11 the defendant
was ordered to produce books of the company which were at
the time in another state. The defendant refused and was fined
for contempt. To the objection that due process of law was
denied the defendant because the statute authorized the infliction
of a fine by the court for failure to perform an act outside the
state, Mr. Justice Peckham said, "There can surely be no illegality
in providing that a corporation doing business in the state and
protected by its power may be compelled to produce before a
tribunal of the state material evidence in the shape of books or
papers kept by it in the state, and which are in its custody and
control, although for the moment outside the borders of the
state."' 1 0 Here, then, was a case which called for the doing of
an act outside the limits of the state, and the enforcement of the
decree offered no difficulties as the defendant was within the
jurisdiction and did business therein.
In another case14 1 the defendant, a resident of the District of
Columbia, was ordered by the Maryland court to deliver up sonic
silver plate located in the District of Columbia. Another case 42
granted the plaintiff specific performance of certain contracts
which were to be performed outside of the district of the court
and enjoined the defendant from violating any of the provisions
which the court ordered the defendant specifically to performl." 1
The court quoted from Phelps v. McDonald,"4 in which Air.
Justice Swayne said:'
"Where the necessary parties are before a court of equity,
it is immaterial that the res of the controversy, whether it be real
or personal property, is beyond the territorial jurisdiction of the
tribunal. It has the power to compel the defendant to do all
139(1908) 207 U. S. 541, 28 Sup. Ct. 178, 52 L. Ed. 327.
14But see Port Royal R. R. v. Hammond, (1877) 58 Ga. 523,
where the Georgia court refused specific performance of a contract
to keep open ditches and maintain and erect cattle guards in South
Carolina, on the ground that the Georgia corporation was an artificial
person and could not be compelled to do acts in a state where it has
no legal existence to perform the same.
'4'Carrol v. Lee, (1832) 3 G. & J. (Md.) 504, 22 Am. Dec. 350.
4°2Western Union Telegraph Co. v. Pittsburgh, C. C. & St. L. Ry..
(C.C.N.D. Ill. 1905) 137 Fed. 435.
243See also Wilhite v. Skelton, (C.C.A. 8th Cir. 1906) 149 Fed. 67.
where Judge Sanborn said, "The court had jurisdiction of the defend-
ants, and thereby had plenary power to compel them to act in relation
to the leasehold without its jurisdiction which they owned and to which
the contract related."
14(1878) 99 U. S. 298, 25 L. Ed. 473.
145Phelps v. McDonald, (1878) 99 U. S. 298, 308, 25.L. Ed. 473.
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things necessary according to the lex loci rei sitae, which he could
do voluntarily, to give full effect to the decree against hitml.""10
From the foregoing cases, it can be seen that courts of equity
frequently render decrees which, if complied with, necessarily
call for the doing of some act outside the territorial limits of the
court, and occasionally render decrees affirmatively ordering some
act to be done in another state.
The tendency of the modern decisions is to pay less attention
to the state lines, which formerly were considered insurmountable
barriers, and, when the court has personal jurisdiction over the
parties to the suit, to render any suitable decree, directed to and
binding upon the parties to the suit, even to the extent of directing
an act to be done outside of the state.
CONCLUSIONS
The preceding discussion warrants the following tentative
conclusions.
(1) Where the equities are such as to demand interference,
so as to prevent a party from obtaining an inequitable advantage
to the injury of the other party, and to enable the court to do
justice, an equity court, having personal jurisdiction over a resident
defendant, can enjoin proceedings instituted by him in a foreign
tribunal.
(2) Courts of equity, having personal jurisdiction over the
parties, in cases calling for equitable relief, can decree a convey-
ance of foreign land.
(a) The decree of itself will not pass title to land, and a
deed must be given by the party who has the legal title.
(b) In case the party to whom the decree is directed refuses
to convey, the decree can be set up as a cause of action in the state
wherein the land is located, and will there be recognized as con-
clusive of all the rights and equities adjudicated therein.
(c)It is not necessary that there exist an antecedent obliga-
tion on the part of the defendant to convey those lands to entitle
the equitable decree to full faith and credit in the state wherein
the land is located.
146In French, Trustee v. Hay, (1874) 22 Wall. (U.S.) 250, 22 L. Ed.
857, Mr. Justice Swayne said, "The court having jurisdiction in per-
sonam had power to require the defendant to do or to refrain from
doing anything beyond the limits of its territorial jurisdiction which it
might have required to be done or omitted within the limits of such
territory."
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(3) Courts of equity have power to restrain or compel the
doing of acts outside the territorial limits of the state.
(a)If a positive act in another state is necessary in order to
comply with the decree, that fact alone is not enough to defeat
the jurisdiction of the court which directs its decree to the parties.
(b) Where the relief sought calls for the doing of some act in
another state, where the court has personal jurisdiction over the
parties, it is not a question of jurisdiction at all, but is merely a
question of expediency as to whether or not in the particular case
the court will exercise the power which is discretionary in all courts
of equity.
